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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MILAN M. BOYCE,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendants, Appellants.

12308

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent brought suit against appellants alleging
damages to property owned by him. Said damages were
allegedly caused by respondent's highway construction. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss in the District Court in
Salt Lake County. The present interlocutory appeal challenges the court's denial of respondent's motion to dismiss.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court denied respondent's motion to dismiss
afte1· hearing arguments (R-7). Respondent then filed a
petition for interlocutory appeal (R-19-21). Said appeal
was granted by this court (R-18).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks reversal of the lower court's order
denying its motion to dismiss and requests that appellant's
cause of action be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A complaint was filed by the State of Utah on June 25,
1969, Civil No. 187531 (R-1-9). The plaintiff in this action was the State of Utah by and through its Road Commission, and the defendants were Ezra H. Anderson and
Priel N. Anderson, his wife; Prince Block and Brick Company; George B. Jones, a single man; American Savings
and Loan.
The action was brought by the State to acquire by eminent domain property and property rights held by the aforementioned defendants. The State filed a Motion for Order
of Immediate Occupancy on June 25, 1969 (R-10). The
parties were served on June 26, 1969 (R-13A). Said Motion was granted on July 9, 1969 (R-25-27).
Defendants, Ezra H. Anderson and Priel N. Anderson,
filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint on July 15, 1969
(R-29-31). Defendant, American Savings and Loan filed
an answer on July 3, 1969 (R-14-20).
In the answer of Ezra H. Anderson, they allege in
Paragraph 2 :

"That by reason of the taking of the properties
here involved, together with the nature and manner

..

t>

of construction of the highway project in the manner contemplated, the remainder portion of the

properties sold under contract by these defendcrnts
will susta·in and have sustained severance damages,
all of which will result in a substantial diminution
in the fair market value of said remaining properties." (Emphasis added) (R-30).
A Stipulation for Judgment was agreed to, signed and
filed on February 6, 1970 (R-37-39). All defendants, either
themselves or through their respective attorneys, signed
the Stipulation (R-39). Paragraph 4 of said Stipulation
provides:
"Just compensation is due from the plaintiff
to these defendants for the acquisition of their interests in the property condemned by the plaintiff
herein and for such damages to other property as

may be recoverable under law, by virtue of the acquisition as defined in the complaint." (Emphasis
added) (R-38).

Paragraph 5 of rn.id Stipulation provides:
"Just compensation for the interests of these
defendants in the condemned premises, together

with all damages as provided by law, is the smn of

$16,000."

(Emphasis added) (R-38).

A Judgment on Stipulation was signed by the Honorable l\fo;:cellus K Snow on February 6, 1970 (R-40-41).
Sairl
was based on the above mentioned Stipulaticn (H-"10).
A Satisfaction of Judgment was signed by all defendants, eithe1· themselves or through their attorneys, on
March 17, 1970 (R-45-46). A Final Order of Condemnation

4

was signed by the Honorable D. F. Wilkins and filed May
1, 1970 (R-42-44).
A full description of the taking along with maps was
filed with the complaint (R-37-9). At no time has the State
altered or amended the taking as described in the original
complaint. Respondent has not alleged in his complaint
that there has been a change in the design of the roadway
or that the plans included in the complaint were not followed.
The approved appraisal indicated in the State's complaint was for $13,700 (R-3). The settlement later agreed
upon was for $16,000 (R-37-39).
Mr. Boyce, the respondent in the instant case, was not
a defendant in Case No. 187531 and was never added as a
party defendant. The record discloses no attempt by Mr.
Boyce to negotiate settlement, nor is there any evidence of
him contacting the Attorney General's Office and inquiring
as to the settlement of the case.
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL NO. 187531 IS A
FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS
OF DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE
ST ATE' S TAKING IN THIS CASE AND
THEREFORE RES JUDICATA AND A BAR TO
THE INSTANT ACTION.
For a judgment to be res judicata it must be a final
determination on the merits. The question in the instant

case is, "When a judgment is by stipulation between the
parties, is this a final judgment on the
In the
case of Suttle v. Seely, 94 Ariz. 161, 382 P. 2d 576 (1963),
the Arizona Supreme Court said:
"A consent judgment entered by Stipulation of
the parties, is just as valid as a judgment resulting
from a trial on the merits, and a decree of dismissal
with prejudice made upon that Stipulation is a final
determination and is res judicata as to all issues
that were raised or could have been determined
under the pleadings." Id. at p. 572.
As this case indicates a Judgment by Stipulation is
as conclusive as one rendered by a jury. This would have
to be so or parties would not be inclined to settle matters
by stipulation because of the lack of its conclusiveness. A
Stipulated Judgment is as final and binding as a Judgment
rendered by a jury.
The matters concluded by a Judgment are set out generally in 30 C. J. S., Eminent Domain § 328 p. 204-206:
"The principles of res judicata apply to final
orders, judgments, and decrees in condemnation proceedings as to matters therein litigated. In accordance with the rules governing the application of the
doctrine of res judicata ... parties and their privies
are concluded as to all matters which were put in
issue, or might have been put in issue ... So, when
damages have been assessed and a final judgment
of condemnation entered, there is no basis for a
second action to condemn the same land for the
same purpose."
In the instant case the issue of severance damage was
an issue in the original case. The statute in Utah regarding
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eminent domain specifically makes severance damages an
issue in all cases where not all of a condemnee's property
is taken. Section 78-34-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides:
"The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal evidence as may be offered by and of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess :

* * *
(2) If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff."
It is clear from this statute that severance damage is

always an issue when there is land remaining after the
take. In the instant case, the State did not take all of the
land in question and there was remaining land. The answer
of one of the defendants, Ezra Anderson, specifically alleges
damage to the remainder.
Defendant submits that severance damage was in issue
in the original case, and that issue along with the issue of
the value of the land taken was set to rest when Judgment
was entered in that case. The foremost authority in eminent domain law states the rule as follows:
" ... when the condemnation of land is effected by
judicial proceedings, in which the owner may appear
and insist upon observance of every substantial requirement of law before his title is divested, once

a final judgment of condemnation has been entered
.
'
such Judgment cannot be attacked collaterally in any
other form of action, except for lack of jurisdiction,
fraud, or where such judgment is otherwise void."
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 6 p. 409, 410.
Respondent in the instant case has not challenged the
jurisdiction of the court in the original case. Respondent
at no time entered into negotiations for settling the original
case. It is difficult to comprehend how he could have been
defrauded by the settlement when he did not enter into it.
The defendants to the original action are not parties
to the instant action. If they were defrauded, they have
not come forward and made a claim.
The appellant in this case paid $16,000 for the property taken and damages allowable under law. There has
been no tender of the $16,000 back to appellant and there
was llO attempt to have the judgment set aside. Respondent vrnuld have appellant pay damages twice for the same
taking.
If judgments are subject to collateral attack, the con-

cept of finality is clefeated.
The Illinois Court stated the rule regarding finality
of .Judgments in the case of M cReynolds v. City of West

Fianl:f01·t, 3 Ill. App. 2d 406, 122 N. E. 2d 433 (1954):
"It is a general rule that the judgment in a
condemnation suit is final and determinative on all
questions of damage, past, present and future as to
the lands and interest described." Id. at P. 431i.
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The Court also stated:
"When damages have been assessed and a final
judgment of condemnation entered, there is no basis
for a second action to condemn to same land for the
same purpose . . . the principle of res judicata is
applied, and the verdict and judgment in a condemnation suit settles all objections which might
have been raised, whether actually raised or not
. . . In a condemnation suit, 'the owner must recover in one proceeding all the damages which have
resulted, or are reasonably likely to result in the
future, and no subsequent action will lie to recover
items which were or might have been considered in
the original proceeding, the presumption being that
all proper damages were considered in such proceeding'." Id. at 435.
Appellant may have a cause of action if the original
plans for construction were not followed and damages resulted to his property due to such a deviation. The general
rule regarding this is stated in 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain, Section 451, p. 369. This rule was stated by the
Washington Supreme Court in Feuerborn v. State of Washington, 59 Wash. 2d 142, 367 P. 2d 143 (1961) :
"When State elects to have issue of damages
in condemnation proceeding determined in relation
to specific plans and evidence submitted by it, State
is bound by such plans in evidence; if State deviates
from such plans, issue of damages is reopened." Id.
at P. 144.
The plans filed by the State of Utah in its original
proceeding have not been deviated from and respondent has
not so alleged.

POINT II.
RESPONDENT HAD NO INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF TAK ING;
THEREFORE, HAS NO STANDING.
Respondent had no property interest in the subject
property at the time the original action was initiated by
the State. Utah law specifies that the time of taking is the
date when the summons is served to commence condemnation proceedings. Section 78-34-11, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"For the purpose of assessing compensation
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of the service of summons,
and its actual value at that date shall be the measure
of compensation for all property to be actually taken,
and the basis of damages to property not actually
taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where
such damages are allowed, as provided in the next
preceeding section. No improvements put upon the
property subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be included in the assessment of compensation of damages.". (Emphasis added.)
As the above-cited statute clearly indicates, the right
to damages accrues on the date the summons is served. Respondent in the instant case had no interest in the property
at that time. The fact that it was not respondent but the
parties who had an interest at the time of service of summons who negotiated a settlement further bares this doctrine out. It is also noted by appellant that none of the
parties who negotiated the settlement have joined in the
instant action. If respondent has a cause of action, it should
be against those who sold him the property.
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The general rule for when damages will be assessed
is discussed in Nichols on Eminent Domain.
"It is well settled that when there is a taking
of property by eminent domain in compliance with
law, it is the owner of the property at the time of
the taking who is entitled to the compensation which
the law provides, and consequently, if the parcel of
land from which the taking is made changes
after the taking occurred but before the compensation has been paid, the right to receive the compensation does not run with the land, but remains a
personal claim in the hands of the person who was
the owner at the time of the taking or his representatives.

"To carry this rule into effect, a certain point
of time in the proceeding by which the land is taken
must be agreed upon as constituting the punctwn
temporis when the taking occurs . . . " N·iclwls on
Eminent Domain, Vol. 2, Section 5.1 [ 4] pp. 11, 12.
In Utah the punctum temporis when the taking occurs
is established by statute as the date of the service of summons. U. C. A., Section 78-34-11 (1953), supra.

Nichols further states the reason for this rule:
"As considerable time frequently elapses after
the taking before compensation is assessed and paid,
in such jurisdictions the rule that the right to com·
pensation does not run with the land after the taking is frequently of practical importanse." Nichols
on Eminent Domain, Vol. 2 supra, p. 13.
The practic2..l need for this rule is emphasized by the
instant case. The State of Utah when it initiates eminent
. · · t st
domain proceedings determines who the part ies m m ere
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are. In Utah there often is a great lapse of time after the
service of summons before payment is made. If the right
to compensation ran with the land, the State may find itself
in the position of settling a case with the parties who held
an interest on the date of the service of summons only to
find at a later date that the property had been sold between
the service of summons' date and the date of settlement.
The new property owner may then come in and claim a
right to compensation in a new lawsuit. For obvious reasons, it is necessary that the time of taking be established
and property interests defined to prevent continued litigation. Without a rule such as this, the concept of finality
in the law would be of little meaning.
This rule has been applied in many cases. In the case
of People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d 897, 151 P. 2d 641 at 643
( 1944), the court stated:
"In fixing awards in condemnation cases, compensation must be paid to the owner as their respective interests shall i:i,ppear at the time when the
taking of property for a public use is deemed to
occur ... at the date of the issuance of summons."
The United States Supreme Court stated:
"The owner at the time the government takes
possession in a condemnation proceeding, rather
than the owner at an earlier or later date, is the
one to receive payment."
United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17 at p. 22 (1958).
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 344
P. 2d 862 at 863, stated:
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"The condemnee is entitled to the fair market
value of his property at the time of service of summons in the condemnation proceedings ... "
The summons in the original condemnation proceeding
regarding the property and property rights in the instant
case was served prior to respondent obtaining an interest
in the property.
POINT III.
THE STATE OF UTAH IS NOT LIABLE FOR
THE ACTS OF ITS AGENTS IN THIS CASE.
The State of Utah is a sovereign entity and immune
from suits initiated against it by persons allegedly injured
by acts done by its agents, 81 C. J. S. States § 130. This
immunity may be waived by statutory provision allowing
recovery from the State. The State of Utah has enacted
legislation waiving immunity in certain circumstances.
Governmental Immunity Act 63-30-1 - 63-30-34 Utah Code
Annotated, ( 1953 as amended).
This statute provides:
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this
act, all governmental entities shall be immune from
suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. 63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended).
The State takes the position that none of the provisions
in the Governmental Immunity Act allow the instant action
to be brought. In fact the contrary is true. Respondent
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alleges that agents of appellant misrepresented conditions
that would exist after the roadway was constructed. Section 63-30-10 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
provides:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of his employment except if the
injury:

(6) arises out of a misrepresentation by said employee whether or not such is negligent or intentional ... "
Even if the allegations, regarding misrepresentations
of State employees, made by respondent were true, the Utah
statute specifically provides that the State has not waived
immunity in such cases.
The Arizona Supreme Court dealt with this issue in a
very recent case in that state. The court in the case of
Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz. App. 597, 435 P. 2d 726 (1968)
considered the argument that a state employee had made
statements regarding access to the property owner's land
after the roadway was built. This testimony was not allowed and in refusing to admit it the court stated, citing
from Kirby v. State, 157 P. 2d 698 (1945) :
". . . 'the general rule is that !aches, acquiescence,
or unreasonable delay in the performance of duty on
the part of the officers of the state is not imputable
to the state when acting in its character as sovereign.
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We know of no authority to the contrary . . . We
therefore, hold under the established rule that thfa
defense is ineffectual.'
The State is certainly acting in its sovereign authority in condemnation proceedings. Estoppel in pais
will not prevent the State from asserting any of ib
defenses or claims."

Cracchiolo v. State, supra, p. 792.
In the instant case respondent alleges that state repre·
sentatives made misrepresentations to him and he bases
his cause of action upon these misrepresentations (R-2-3).
A cause of action such as this is prohibited because of the
State's position as a sovereign and such immunity has not
been waived.
Even if there were some way to find that the State
had waived its immunity, respondent has failed to follow
the procedure outlined in the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended) requires notice to be filed with the agency con·
cerned. No such notice has been filed with the State Road
Commission. Section 63-30-19, Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended) requires an undertaking of at least $300 to
be filed at the time the action is filed. In the instant case
no undertaking has been filed by respondent.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the judgment in Civil No.
187531 is a final determination on the merits of the issues
that were rnised or could have been raised in that case.
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The matters finally determined are res judicata and not
subject to collateral attack. One of the matters finally concluded by Civil No. 187531 was that of severance damage.
Respondent should be prohibited from recovering when,
as is clearly indicated in the Stipulation for Judgment, the
payment made included severance damages.
Appellant also submits that at the time of taking, to
wit: the date the summons was served, respondent had no
property interest in the land which is the subject of this
lawsuit and therefore has no standing.
Appellant further submits that the Sovereign Immunity Act in Utah specifically precludes this type of an action
from being brought. Respondent bases his claim on the
misrepresentations of state employees and said claims are
not allowed under the statute.
Appellant submits that any one of these three bases
is sufficient to warrant reversal of the lower court's denial
of appellant's motion to dismiss.
Appellant respectfully asks this court to find that the
lower court erred and grant appellant's motion to dismiss
accordingly.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DONALD S. COLEMAN
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Appellants

